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what a legitimate government necessarily consists of; that is, I will attempt to formulate a number of
conditions a government must meet in order to be considered legitimate.
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Paul A. Konczal
Critical Citizenship:
A Theory on the Foundations of Legitimate Government

Introduction
In this paper, it is my intention to discuss the issue of legitimacy as it
relates to government. I will explore what a legitimate government necessarily
consists of; that is, I will attempt to formulate a number of conditions a
government must meet in order to be considered legitimate.
A logical starting point in an investigation of legitimate government
would seem to be an account of the original purpose of government. Problems
arise, though, in discovering this original purpose; any and all attempts seem
to consist of mere speculation. Government is a social convention created by
man. * It is doubtful whether or not there can ever be an empirically accurate
account of the creation of government Without this crucial information, a
search for the original purpose of government appears futile. I had once
thought that an account of human nature may provide insight into this enigma;
I now believe that it is equally doubtful that there can be a true account of
human nature. So where does this leave the political theorist?
There appear to be two options. The ftrst of these options is to abandon
all hope of ever having a foundational theory of legitimate government It is
better to throw in the towel than to give in to speculation. This suggests that
the political theorist can only make use of existing governments, constitutions,
decrees, actions, and the such to investigate legitimate government. To look
outside of these would lead to nothing but speculation. Even this, though,
seems to be an unacceptable route. The political theorist would be reduced
to nothing more than a historian of governments past and present. In addition,
the theorist would have to embrace the assumption that a legitimate
government is not only possible, but has been actualized. That is, the theorist
would have to assume in advance that there has been or currently is a
legitimate government in existence. This is a huge assumption and one that
I am unwilling to accept.
The second option the political theorist has is to accept that any attempt
to give a foundational theory of legitimate government will depend partly
upon speculation. This does not mean, of course, that this speculation has no
boundaries. The theorist must tailor a speculative account as closely as
possible to the reality of things. What I mean by this is that the theorist must
"'Author's note: I make use of the word 'man' throughout this essay to refer to all of
humankind. I realize that the use of 'man' is by most accounts archaic, but for the
sake of simplicity and style I have used it anyway. My use of 'man' is not a deliberate
attempt to be sexist.
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----------------------=-try to mirror reality as closely as possible, only filling in those areas which
need filling. In addition, the theorist has an obligation to makeclear which
parts are empirical and which parts are speculative.
On the speculative side, most theories of legitimacy will include both
an account of human nature and the origins of government. These accounts
are not to be taken as literal histories, or even historical theories. Speculative
accounts should be taken at face value and appreciated for what they are:
useful thought experiments. To take an account of human nature or the origins
of government in any other way is foolish at best. It is my belief that there is
an inherent value in these thought experiments. They are tremendous starting
points for theories of legitimate government and reveal a great amount of
insight into the views of the theorist. I believe that in adopting the position
espoused by the second option articulated above is much more palatable
than that of following the first. Thus, I will proceed in my investigation of
legitimate government as has been prescribed.

The Nature of Man: A Thought Experiment
To understand the nature of man is not to understand the individual but
rather the community. Man, like all other animals, is driven by a desire for
self-preservation. Unlike other creatures though, man is not satisfied with
just mere sustainment. Once man is secure in his self-preservation, man is
driven to explore his potential, to progress and find happiness. Man cannot
truly recognize his potential in isolation. Man cannot progress in isolation.
Man cannot find happiness in isolation. Man cannot survive in isolation.
Thus to understand the nature of man is to realize that man is a social creature.
Because of this, man is driven to gather together and form society. Society is
a necessary component of human nature; to ignore the necessity of society
for man is to ignore an essential component of man. Man cannot and will not
survive without society. A true society can only exist among just individuals,
for only justice promotes trust and society cannot function unless the
individuals within it trust one another. A society composed of unjust
individuals will fail to function properly and will eventually deteriorate into
a state of anarchy. Thus because man is social by nature, man has a natural
duty to himself and all others to act justly.
While man is a social creature by nature, man is at the same time selfish
by nature. Man is driven to form society in order to recognize his potential.
Man is driven to form society so that he may progress. Man is driven to form
society in order to find his happiness. Man is driven to form society so that
he can survive. Man ultimately forms society for selfish reasons. To act in a
selfish manner is to act unjustly. Society, however, cannot survive when it is
composed of selfish individuals; thus man is in conflict with himself. Man is
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social by nature which requires man to act in a just manner. Man is also
selfish by nature which creates a desire within him to act in an unjust manner.
How can man resolve this conflict within himself? Man must live within
society in order to secure his survival and promote his prosperity, thus man
must suppress his selfish desires. Man is not perfect and because of this no
individual can be confident that every individual within society, himself
included, will not succumb to selfish desires. Thus a necessity arises within
society to insure that individuals will be forced to keep their injustices under
control. From this originates the need for an authority to enforce order within
society arises. It is this authority that we have come to call government.
The basic function of government is to maintain order within society by
insuring that every individual within society follows a basic code of otherregarding morality. In order to insure this, the right to use force against
individuals is granted to the government. Government is given the right to
make laws and punish individuals who disobey these laws. Government is
given power in exchange for providing order and security within society.
How does government derive this power? Do citizens have an obligation to
follow the commands of a government? In other words, what are the
foundations of legitimate government? The remainder of this paper will be
dedicated to the exploration these questions.
Consent Theory
Any examination of legitimate government should give proper attention
to consent theory. Consent theory has dominated much of the discussion on
legitimate government since the seventeenth century. Theories of consent
which theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau have put forth differ
greatly from one another but agree on one central idea-the idea that no
government can have true legitimate authority over the citizens of a state
without the consent of those citizens. This central idea is the focal point of
every consent theory to date.
A great deal of the following analysis of consent theory is based on A.
John Simmons' analysis of consent theory in Moral Principles and Political
Obligation. According to Simmons there are four essential theses associated
with consent theory (Simmons, 1979: 61-62). The first of these theses is that
man is born naturally free. Consent theorists refer to this time when man is
naturally free as "the state of nature." What is meant by naturally free is not
that each individual has no restrictions whatsoever, but that individuals are
not born with political obligations. Individuals do, however, have natural
duties which they are born with and must obey. Thus, consent theorists
distinguish between two types of bonds: natural and conventional. Since
political obligation is a conventional obligation, Le., an obligation which is
made by individuals themselves, no individual is born with it, but rather
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acquires it by some fonn of a voluntary action. Natural duties, on the other
hand, are inherited by all of mankind and thus no individual is exempt from
them, nor do they require any sort of voluntary action to make them binding.
The ftrst thesis ignores the conflict between the social nature of man
and the selfIsh nature of man. Man is social by nature and thus is driven to
fonn society. Man is also driven by selfIsh desires which cause him to act
unjustly. A society composed of unjust individuals will deteriorate into a
state of anarchy, thus a need arises for some fonn of authority within society
to insure that all individuals act in ajust manner. The institution ofgovernment
fulfIlls this need, thus government is born of necessity. Man is not born free
from political bonds, man is born ignorant of his political bonds. It is only
by realizing the need for political bonds that man can overcome the conflict
within himself. Government allows man to be free from his selfIsh desires
by suppressing these desires. Man is not born free; man is born ignorant.
Only by realizing that government is necessary can man enter society. Only
by entering society can man survive and prosper.
The second thesis put forward by consent theorists is that man can give
up his natural freedom only through a voluntary act of consent. A voluntary
act of consent is an act which generates an obligation between an individual
and a government The act of consent gives the government the right to act
in areas where only the individual was able to act before. The act of consent
is not only the granting of this right to the government, but also an agreement
by the individual to not interfere with the government's use of this right.
Two types of consent are offered by consent theorists, express and tacit.
Express consent is given by saying something, perfonning some sort of a
gesture, or failing to do these at an appropriate time. Thus, raising my hand,
saying "I do:' or failing to speak up when objections are asked for are all
fonns of express consent. There are two criteria that all fonns of express
consent must meet. First, an act of express consent must be intentional. That
is, the individual must know what it means to perfonn such an act Second,
the act must be voluntary. An individual has not really consented to anything
if he gives his consent under the threat physical violence (Simmons, 1979:
77).

Consent theorists have long recognized that express consent alone is not
a suitable ground for political obligation. Rarely, if at all, are individuals
given a chance to give express consent to their governments. Consent theorists,
therefore, must rely on the concept of tacit consent to generate political
obligation among individuals.Tacit consent is an alternative to express consent
which is no less binding than express consent. Just exactly what qualiftes as
an act of tacit consent, though, is widely debated. Do we limit tacit consent
to mere silence or inactivity, or do we make it so broad that basically anyone
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who is in a state gives his consent to that government just by virtue of living
there?
Consent theory's second thesis is problematic in two ways. The first
problem consent encounters is a pragmatic problem. Consent theory offers
two types of consent: express and tacit. Rarely, though, is there ever an
occasion where an individual has the opportunity to perlonn an act of express
consent. Express consent is in all actuality an impractical basis for political
obligation and thus does not merit any further discussion. This being the
case, there is only one type of consent which is a viable option for the basis
of political obligation-tacit consent. What exactly counts as tacit consent
though? John Locke, in his Second Treatise a/Government, seems to believe
that simply enjoying the benefits provided by the government of a state is an
act of tacit consent (Locke, 1980: 63-65). If this is so, then anyone who is
born into a state, lives in that state, is educated in that state, travels along the
highways of that state, or anything else along these lines is obligated to the
authority of the government of that state. It seems that tacit consent requires
that just about everybody is obligated to the state in which they live inregardless of their personal preference.
The purpose of consent theory is to base political obligation in personal
choice. When benefits are provided by a government is there a warning which
states "Recipients of this benefit will be obligated to the government of this
state?" When someone purchases a house are they given a contract which
states "The owner of this house understands that property ownership within
the boundaries of this states obligates you to the government of this state?"
Tacit consent defined as owning property or enjoying the benefits provided
by the state eliminates the essential feature of consent theory-personal
choice. Thus we see the second problem that consent theory possesses; tacit
consent devalues the importance of a person's choice whether ornot to consent
to government and in doing this does not remain consistent with the central
idea of all consent theory-the idea that no government can have legitimate
authority over the citizens of a state without the consent of those citizens.
The third thesis forwarded by consent theory is that the act of consent
protects individuals from harm by the government. AU legitimate authority
over an individual is derived from the consent of that individual, thus no
government that the individual has not consented to can have legitimate
authority over the individual. AU individuals, therefore, are protected from
being obligated to the laws of an unjust government simply because they are
born there. This aspect of consent theory-allowing everyone to choose their
own political allegiance-is very attractive. By basing political obligation
in personal choice, consent theorists place political power in the hands of
individuals. The act of consent protects individuals from harm by the
government, because no government that an individual has not consented to
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can have legitimate authority over an individual. Thus all individuals are
protected from being obligated to the laws of an unjust government simply
because they are born there.
This third thesis tries to correlate the protection from being forced to
obey to unjust laws to the protection from being harmed by a government;
this correlation, however, is unsuccessful. If I happen to be born in a tyrannical
government whose authority I do not consent to, does this translate into
protection from being harmed by that government? I would not say that I am
protected from being harmed by this government simply because I have not
consented to its authority. An unjust government does not care whether or
not it has legitimate authority over an individual" Consent cannot and does
not protect individuals from harm by unjust governments. The only protection
from an unjust government is its elimination. The elimination of unjust
governments can only be accomplished by overthrowing the government
and implementing ajust fonn of government in its place. Unjust governments
cannot be refonned; almost invariably, their corruption runs deep to their
core. Consent is a valuable tool for refonn and thus can be used to prevent
just governments from deteriorating to unjust governments. Citizens can
protest unjust laws made by just governments by openly refusing to obey the
unjust laws themselves and calling for their refonn. Consent cannot, however,
protect individuals from unjust governments; only revolution can protect
individuals from unjust governments. Refonn can only occur when a just
foundation exists in the fIrst place.
The fourth thesis advanced by consent theory is that the government's
purpose is to serve the interests of its citizens. The people give the government
the right to have authority over them, thus it is from the people that government
derives its power. This being the case, a government is accountable to the
people for everything it does. Not only, then, does consent theory protect
individuals from being subjected to an unjust government which they did
not consent to, but it also protects them from any government that they do
not wish to consent to. In other words, an individual's right to choose is
protected by consent theory. The individual is emphasized by consent theory
and it is this fact that makes consent theory a liberal theory.
This fourth thesis argues that the government's purpose is to serve the
interests of its citizens. I would argue to the contrary, the purpose of
government is to maintain order within society. Government's purpose is not
to serve the interests of the citizens. Because man is both selflsh by nature
and social by nature, man's interests are conflicting. It is the government's
role in society to resolve this conflict within the individual. The purpose of
government is to suppress the selfish desires of man so that man can survive
and prosper. So in one sense, government's purpose to serve the interests of
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the citizens--in the same way that a parent who disciplines her child in an
appropriate way serves the interest of that child.
This discussion of consent theory has lead to a number of conclusions.
First, any theory which depends upon consent to generate political bonds
will have trouble being able to generate widespread obligation among
individuals. Nevertheless, man cannot survive and prosper without
government, thus man is not born free from political bonds. Second, the
only protection citizens have from unjust governments is their elimination
through revolution. But consent cannot be used in revolution. It can onIt be
used as a tool for reform. Finally, the purpose of government is not merely
to serve the interests of its citizens but rather to insure that all citizens act in
a minimally just manner. These three points underscore why consent theory
fails to offer a suitable account of the foundations of legitimate government.
I now turn to begin developing my own theory on the foundations of legitimate
government.
The Nature of Political Bonds: Conventional or Natural?
One issue that is intimately related to the topic of legitimate government
is the basis of political bonds. Political bonds are the moral requirements
that oblige individuals to obey governments. A theory on the foundations of
legitimate government must be able to account for political bonds in order to
be complete. Thus, the question of what is the basis of political bonds must
be addressed. In order to address this question, a discussion on the nature of
bonds in general would seem to be a logical place to start.
A bond is a moral requirement that an individual must fulfill; bonds are
restrictions on an individual's freedom. There exist two types of bonds:
conventional and natural. Conventional bonds are bonds created by individuals
themselves, e.g., obligations and promises. Conventional bonds are acquired
through some form of voluntary consent and thus individuals cannot be born
with conventional bonds. Natural bonds, on the other hand, are bonds
individuals are born with. Natural bonds are commonly referred to as duties.
Since individuals are born with natural bonds, an individuals have them and
no one individual is exempt from a natural bond.
If the above discussion is valid, then political bonds must be either
conventional or natural. To argue that political bonds are conventional, though,
is to argue that political bonds are acquired through some form of voluntary
consent. In the discussion of consent theory, it was concluded that man is not
born free from political bonds, rather man is born ignorant of his political
bonds. Government is necessary for the survival of society and society is
necessary for the survival and prosperity of man. Political bonds are therefore
necessary for the survival and prosperity of man. Conventional bonds do not
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arise from necessity but rather individual choice. Hence, political bonds cannot
be conventional but instead must be natural.
Natural bonds apply to all individuals, thus all individuals have political
bonds. In other words, all individuals have a duty to obey government This
duty does not apply to all governments, but only just governments. This
means that man has a duty to obey all just governments wherever he may be.
By this I mean an individual has a duty to obey the government of whatever
state he is in as long as that government is just. Thus a theory on the
foundations of legitimate government which is duty based does not run into
the same problem a consent based theory does in generating political bonds
among individuals.
I would like to take the time now to stop and back track for a moment in
order to clarify a point. I have argued that political bonds are natural bonds
yet man is born ignorant of them. By this I am arguing that there exist two
types of natural bonds, or duties. The frrst type of natural duty is what I will
call realized. A realized duty is a duty that an individual is conscious, or
aware, of. The second type of natural duty is what I will call latent. A latent
duty is a duty which an individual is not yet conscious, or aware, of. Thus
man is born with latent political duty which becomes realized political duty
through experience. Anyone who does not recognize that he or she has political
duty is still in the latent phase of consciousness. We are now in a position to
answer the question posed at the beginning of this section: what is the basis
for political bonds? Political bonds are natural bonds and thus all individuals
are born with them. Every individual has a duty to obey any just government
that immediately applies to them (Simmons, 1979: 147-155). Although
individuals are born with political bonds, these bonds remain latent until the
individual is able to recognize them through experience. Even though an
individual recognizes his or her duty to obey his or her government, there
will arise times in which the individual's selfish nature will cause the
individual to come into conflict with the state. I tum now to this conflict
between the individual and the state.
Autonomy

The conflict between the individual and the state is an issue that confronts
every theory on the foundations of legitimate government. For the purpose
of this paper, I will calI this issue the issue of autonomy. Individuals form
society in order to survive and prosper. Government is created to maintain
order within society and thus is granted the power to make laws and punish
any individual who disobeys these laws. An individual who disobeys the
laws of a state acts in a selfish manner and is in conflict with the state; such
an individual lives only by the laws he or she creates. Robert Paul Wolff
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describes an individual who lives only by the laws which he or she creates a
morally autonomous person (Wolff, 1970: 12-19).
Wolff's discussion of moral autonomy begins with the assumption that
all individuals are rational beings. Because all individuals are rational beings,
they are responsible for their actions. Taking responsibility for your actions
means much more than just choosing whether or not to do this or that. Taking
responsibility for your actions means attempting to determine what is the
morally correct choice. Wolff goes on to say "Only because man has the
capacity to reason about his choices can he be said to stand under a continuing
obligation to take responsibility for them" (Wolff, 1970: 12). I question where
this "obligation" stems from. When did man consent to take on this
responsibility? It seems to me that what Wollf is actually talking about here
is a duty because baving the capacity to reason is something that man is born
with. All individuals thus have a duty to take responsibility for their actions.
Wolff later states that "The responsible man is not capricious or anarchic,
for he does acknowledge himself bound by moral restraints. But he insists
that he alone is the judge of those constraints" (Wolff, 1970: 13). It is because
the responsible man lives by the laws he creates for himself using his
rationality that Wolff calls him morally autonomous.
I would like to pose a question for consideration here. According to
Wolff, the responsible man acknowledges that there exist moral restraints
while at the same time insisting that he (man) alone is the judge of these
restraints. I wonder how it is that these moral restraints that the responsible
man acknowledges differ from his personal will? If there is no separation
between the two, then a responsible man can never act immorally, unless he
acts contrary to his own will. All individuals are selfish by nature, though,
and selfish desires lead to unjust actions. No individual is perfect and because
of this no man can suppress his selfish desires at all times. Thus all individuals
act immorally at some point in their lives. No one person should be the final
judge of whether or not something is morally acceptable, for when we base
all morality in personal preference morality itself becomes a subjective
concept.
Thus far an autonomous individual has been defined as someone that
takes responsibility for his or her actions. Taking responsibility for these
actions involves determining whether or not a course of action is the correct
choice. I would argue that taking responsibility for one's actions goes far
beyond determining whether or not something is morally correct. It also
involves talking responsibility for the consequences of morally wrong
decisions; it is this point that Wolff largely ignores. When someone acts
immorally, it means that he or she is acting in a selfish manner. To act in a
selfish manner is to act unjustly. To act unjustly is to be in conflict with
society. Thus anyone who acts immorally is in conflict with the state. The
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government has the power to punish anyone who disobeys the laws of the
state. Therefore, to take responsibility for one's actions means to accept the
punishment associated with a given immoral act, e.g., to pay the fine for a
speeding ticket. (Is it necessarily immoral to speed? Yes and no. It is not
immoral to drive a car fast, but it is immoral to disobey the law of a just
government which happens to regulate speed limits.)
This discussion of the issue of moral autonomy has lead to some very
interesting conclusions. First, being morally autonomous involves taking
responsibility for all your actions and their consequences. This means
accepting the punishment associated with immoral acts. Second, morality
cannot be ground in personal decision, for then morality becomes subjective.
This being the case, a need arises for a way in which standards of morality
within society can be established.

The Will of the Community & the Majority Principle
The issue of autonomy called attention to the need for a way in which
the standards for morality within society can be established. The standards
of morality within society are the foundations of that society's laws. The
standards of morality cannot be determined by personal preference for this
would cause morality to become subjective, which in turn would lead to the
generation of unjust laws. Thus an alternative method must be used to establish
the standards of morality within society. If the will of the individual is
subjective, then that which is contrary to the will of the individual could
possibly be objective. The will of the individual is in constant conflict with
society, thus the will of the community may provide a basis for the standards
of morality within society. To act selfishly is to act in an unjust manner,
while to act towards the common good is to act in a just manner. Thus the
will of the individual leads to unjust behavior and the will of the community
leads to just behavior. Therefore, a method is needed to discover the will of
the community.
The community is composed of separate individuals who have come
together to form one body and thus the will of the community must bring the
various opinions of all these individuals into one voice. The will of these
separate individuals may not have any sort of solidarity; there may be twenty
different opinions as to what the good of the community is, or should be.
How can one voice represent all the opinions among the individuals within
society? One answer to this question is that the use of the majority principle
will generate one definitive voice to represent the will of the community.
The majority principle assumes that all men are created equal. Because
of this, no single individual's opinion is naturally superior to another
individual's opinion. If the quality of opinions is more or less eq.ual, "then
the only differentiating factor left is quantity" (Barry, 1979: 193). In other
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words, society is composed of individuals who are equal by nature; the only
factor which can make one opinion superior to another is the number of
individuals who support it. Thus an opinion which is backed by a majority of
individuals carries more weight than an opinion supported by a minority.
John Locke presents his argument for the majority principle in the Second
Treatise of Govemment by stating:
For when any number of men have... made a community, they have
thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one
body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority:
and it being necessary the body should move that way whither the
greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else
it is impossible it should act or continue as one body, one community;
and so everyone is bound by that consent concluded by the majority.
And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by
positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which
impowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the
whole, and of course determines, the power of the whole (Locke,
1980:52).
Thus by using the majority principle it appears that the will of the
community can be discovered. If the will of the community can be revealed,
then the standards of morality within society can be established as well.
Once the standards of morality are established, they become the basic
foundations of law and order within society. These standards of morality,
however, cannot be placed upon a throne and never reviewed, for society
would then become stagnant and deteriorate. To prevent society from
stagnation and deterioration, the standards of morality must constantly be
reviewed and revised. The only way that this can be accomplished is through
open deliberation. Thus a government must not regulate the open excbange
of ideas within society.

Conclusion: Critical Citizenship
Tbe discussion thus far on a theory of the foundations of legitimate
government bas lead to a number of plausible conclusions. First, government
arose out of necessity. Man is a creature born into conflict with bimself. On
the one band, man is social by nature; on the other band, man is selfish by
nature. It is government's role in society to suppress the selfish side of man
so that man may live in society. Man cannot and will not survive nor prosper
without society, thus government is necessary for man's survival and
prosperity. Second, because government is necessary for man, man bas no
cboice whether or not to be obligated to government If man is to survive and
prosper, man must be in some sense bound to government Man is not born
free from political bonds, rather be is born ignorant of political bonds. Tbus,
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man's political bonds are latent duties. In other words, political bonds are
natural bonds which man comes to realize through experience. The third
conclusion that was arrived at in this discussion of the foundations of
legitimate government is that morally autonomous individuals accept
responsibility for the consequences of their actions. This means that the
morally autonomous accept, within reason, whatever punishment corresponds
with any immoral actions which they may perform. Morality cannot be based
on individual preference which is subjective, therefore the standards of
mOrality must be determined through an objective process. The only procedure
which can produce results which resemble objectivity is the majority principle.
The reasoning behind this is that the community is essentially one body. In
order for a body to move in anyone direction, a majority of that body must
move in that direction. Since all individuals in society are essentially equal
in quality, only an appeal to the majority of quantity can differentiate between
the preference of the majority and the minority.
I believe that the preference of the majority is the closest man can get to
an objective code of other-regarding morality, thus the majority principle
should be used to determine the standards of morality the state enforces. The
majority principle, however, can only function properly in an atmosphere
where the free exchange of ideas occurs. Open deliberation is needed to
improve and refine the preference of the majority on all issues. By doing this
society will not become stagnant and deteriorate. Open deliberation is
essential to the survival of society, and thus man also. Open deliberation can
only occur in a society in which the government does not prohibit freedom
of expression, thought, and speech. Thus my theory on the foundations of
legitimate government calls for a free and open society in which citizens
have a duty to obey the government and must accept responsibility for each
and every immoral act they commit. The standards of morality shall be
determined by the preference of the majority, but shall be revised when
necessary. Every individual should have a voice, but the community should
also have a voice. It is this voice of the community which the individual
shall obey, but also influence. I call my theory foundations of legitimate
government critical citizenship.
I am borrowing the name critical citizenship from Stephen Nathanson's
Should We Consent to be Governed? Nathanson defines critical citizenship
as "the view that whether one ought to support a government and whether
one has a moral obligation to obey the law depends upon the nature of the
particular government and the nature of the law in question" (Nathanson,
1992: 85). The basic idea behind Nathanson's theory is that as citizens we
are obligated to obey just laws, but that we also have a right to disobey
unjust laws. I believe that Nathanson's theory is a good beginning but it
lacks any sort of completeness. It is my goal to lay the foundations of a
complete theory of critical citizenship.
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Nathanson bases his critical citizenship largely on the ideas and thoughts
articulated by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in his "Letter from Birmingham
City Jail." King sets up four criteria for determining whether or not a law is
just (Nathanson, 1992: 85-86):
"Any law which uplifts human personality is just. Any law which
degrades human personality is unjust:'
(2) "An unjust law is a code that a majority inflicts on a minority that is
not binding on itself."
(3) "An unjust law is a code inflicted upon a minority which had no
part in enacting or creating because they did not have the unhampered
right to vote."
(4) "There are some instance where a law is just on its face but unjust in
its application."
(1)

This theory succeeds in creating a set of criteria for determining whether
or not a specific law made by a just government is just. Since, however, only
legitimate governments can be just, this theory deals only with legitimate
governments; for this reason it is incomplete. This does not mean that
Nathanson's theory on legitimate laws is not useful to my complete theory
of critical citizenship.
Using King's (and Nathanson's) criteria for a just law I was able to
create a set of four criteria to determine whether or not a government is just
or unjust. Those government which are just are legitimate governments, those
that are unjust are illegitimate. In order for a government to be considered
legitimate under critical citizenship it must be able to satisfy the following
set of criteria:
(1) The laws of the state must be derived from ajust ideology. [from King
(1)]
(2) A just procedure must be used for the derivation of the laws of the
state. [from King (3)]
(3) The laws of the state must be applied in ajust manner. [from King (4)]
(4) The consequences of the laws of the state must not violate seriously
any group within the state. [from King (2)]
I will now briefly explain each of these criteria First, any government
which does not have ajust ideology for the basis for its laws will necessarily
have an unjust ideology for the basis for its laws. A legitimate government
cannot be unjust, therefore any government with an unjust system of laws
cannot be legitimate. What is a just ideology? This question is open for
debate. Different individuals have different opinions on what is just. In the
discussion ofTheWill of the Community & the Majority Principle, I suggested
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that government must not regulate the open exchange of ideas within society.
Open deliberation on what is just and what is not will broaden individuals'
minds. Open deliberation allows individuals to hear different perspectives
on issues and this in return does one of two things: (1) it strengthens the
individual's confidence in his opinion or (2) it changes the individual's
opinion. Either way, the individual will be walking away from a deliberation
a better person, a person who has progressed. Second, any government which
does not use just procedures for the derivation of the laws is an illegitimate
government. What is a just procedure? A just procedure is any procedure
which will yield a result approximate to the will of the community, e.g., a
procedure which incorporates the majority principle. Third, any government
which does not implement their laws in a just manner is illegitimate. If some
government made a law which required a written test to be passed in order to
be eligible to vote while at the same time denying a subgroup of society any
education, then that government would be illegitimate. Finally, any
government which makes laws whose consequences seriously violate any
group within the slate is illegitimate. Thus, any government which practices
any form ofdiscrimination, be it racism, sexism, etc., is an unjust government
and thus illegitimate.
I have now given the foundations of a complete theory of critical
citizenship-my theory on the foundations of legitimate government. critical
citizenship is a duty based theory which emphasizes the importance of
deliberation in society. Deliberation is the key to the continuance oflegitimate
governments. Without deliberation, governments become stagnate and
deteriorate. Any government which restricts deliberation is unjust and cannot
be reformed; an unjust government which cannot be reformed must be
overthrown through revolution. When dealing with legitimate governments
though, critical citizenship encourages citizens to challenge a government
when it makes an unjust law. At the same time, critical citizenship reinforces
the idea that individuals must take responsibility for their actions; this means
accepting the punishment for breaking a law. Critical citizenship is a challenge
to everyone who does not participate, yet complains about how unjust and
unfair the government is. Critical citizenship encourages individuals to
participate in politics. Critical citizenship is a call for individuals to make a
difference.
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